





In 1979, the Trademark Reporter published an article that I had written in
law school that surveyed the intellectual history of intellectual property law, and
particularly trademark law, from its earliest inception to the late 1970s.1 The
article focused on the perceived, age-old conflict between encouraging
competition and protecting "monopolistic" property rights in the form of
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The history of trademark law was seen as
playing out the tension between protecting entitlements on the one hand and
encouraging competition by allowing free access to protected trademarks on the
other. In the 1970s, this conflict was most apparent in efforts by the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") to use antitrust laws to directly attack the use of
trademarks as anticompetitive. At another level, this conflict was seen as a
reflection of the tension between formalism and legal realism.
This article traces the recent history of trademark law and considers how
courts, agencies, and legislatures have struggled to resolve the conflict between
protection and access, "property rights" and "free competition," and morality
and policy. The recent history of trademark law has shown a trend toward
greater protection of trademarks and rejection of most claims that trademarks
have anticompetitive effects. In retrospect, the aggressive enforcement actions
taken by the FTC in the 1970s represented the high-water mark of the attack
on trademarks that utilized the argument that trademarks are inherently
anticompetitive. Reflecting a shift in antitrust law generally, trademarks have
been relatively immune from antitrust attack since the early 1980s. Under
current thinking, the goals of antitrust law and trademark protection are
perfectly compatible. This shift in antitrust law parallels judicial developments
in substantive trademark law where the pendulum has swung back in favor of
protection over access. In the recent era, the expansive judicial protection of
trademarks has been undergirded by a general acceptance of the economic
theories of the Chicago School that trademark use is in fact pro-competitive.2
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These recent developments represent the surprising convergence of legal
realist and formalist approaches in bolstering trademark protection. The
ultimate legacy of the 1930s legal realist critique of trademarks as "monopolis-
tic" is the 1990s "law and economics" defense of trademark doctrines as
promoting economic efficiency. In the legislative area, the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 19883 and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995' have
broadened trademark rights and suggest a return to the old concept of
trademarks as "property rights," a view that echoes formalist legal theory of the
nineteenth century.
II
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRADEMARK LAW: THE TENSION BETWEEN
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND COMPETITION
In my previous 1979 aricle,5 I examined the historical development of
trademark law in terms of the interplay between the varied principles underlying
trademark protection (for example, protecting goodwill, promoting commercial
morality, preventing consumer deception) and the policy of promoting free
competition through open access to trademarks. Although that tension does not
explain everything about the history of trademarks, it serves as a useful
paradigm to describe the evolution of trademark legal theory and doctrine.
More generally, the history of trademark law may be understood in the context
of broader currents in legal philosophy and as reflecting historical changes in
legal thought characteristic of other areas of the law.
To briefly summarize that 1979 article, the history of trademark law can be
seen as playing out certain tensions or themes between competing or conflicting
ideas and theories at all levels of legal analysis. At the most basic level of
analysis is the conflict between access and protection. At the level of legal
doctrine is a conflict within legal rules such as "likelihood of confusion" and the
generic/descriptive/suggestive/arbitrary trademark spectrum.6 At the level of
legal theory is a conflict between property rights and free competition in the
market. Finally, at the level of jurisprudence is a conflict between natural rights
and utilitarianism.
In the 200-year history of trademarks, the outcome of these various conflicts
or tensions has occurred against the backdrop of broader changes in legal
philosophy. Broadly speaking, legal history in the United States has evolved
from the formative era to the era of formalism in the late nineteenth century;
3. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1994)).
4. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125 (c)(1), 1127 (1994)).
5. McClure, supra note 1.
6. Trademark cases traditionally recognize a hierarchy or spectrum of the distinctiveness of
trademarks ranging from "generic" (not protected) to "merely descriptive" (not protected) to
"suggestive" (protected) to "arbitrary and fanciful" (protected). 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11.01[1] (3d ed. 1994); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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to the era of legal realism in the 1930s to the era of "reasoned elaboration" in
the years following World War II. In each era, changes can be seen in
trademark law reflecting these broader philosophical trends.7
In the era of formalism, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century, law was reduced to a "science," and legal reasoning was a process of
deducing legal rules mechanically from certain broader principles. The language
of the law itself became determinative of the outcome of legal reasoning; cases
were decided by reasoning deductively from certain principles often embodied
in a single idea or word. Treating trademarks as "property rights" became the
unifying principle for much legal reasoning in the era of formalism.'
As a result of the insights offered by legal realism in the 1930s, much law
and legal reasoning took a radically different approach.9 Because of the
perception that law was not truly a science and that deductive reasoning from
basic principles concealed the real reasons for decisions, judicial decisionmaking
moved toward a more open and pragmatic consideration of policy issues,
empirical facts, and "real world" results. In trademark law, legal realism was
reflected in the evolution of a more fact-oriented analysis of "likelihood of
confusion" in trademark infringement cases.
The legal realists' attack on formalism in legal thought led directly to an
examination of the economic consequences of trademarks. One school of
economic thought advanced the view that protection of trademarks supported
economic monopolies by allowing brand advertising to create product
differentiation that created high barriers to market entry by competitors lacking
market power.' ° These economic theories created judicial uncertainty as to the
value of trademarks generally and led to some judicial hostility to expanding
trademark protection. This economic theory attack on trademark protection
was triggered by a seminal book by economist Edward H. Chamberlin that
presented a reasoned case against trademarks as reinforcing monopoly power."
As legal philosophy developed in the 1940s and 1950s, under the rubric of
"reasoned elaboration," trademark law took on the appearance of a logical and
coherent approach to all issues. 2 Reasoned elaboration allowed for the
consideration of the purposes and policies underlying legal rules (an approach
that the legal realists had advocated), but purely subjective decisionmaking was
seen as controlled by statutory language and the requirement of judges to
articulate their reasoning methodically. Trademark case law became more
animated by the policies and principles underlying trademark legal doctrine. 13
But even this approach concealed more fundamental tensions and underlying
7. McClure, supra note 1, at 310-35.
8. Id. at 316-26.
9. Id. at 326.
10. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
11. EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1st ed. 1933);
McClure, supra note 1, at 329.
12. McClure, supra note 1, at 342-45.
13. Id. at 326-35.
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ideological approaches than was reflected in written opinions and legal
commentary. During this time, trademark doctrine appeared settled and fixed,
and judicial discretion was seen as limited by the constraints of the statutory
language in the Lanham Act passed in 1946.14 But the differences in nearly
identical infringement cases and in the application of doctrines such as
distinguishing unprotected "descriptive" marks from protected "suggestive"
marks, belied more fundamental tensions at work that were not fully explained
by established trademark doctrine.15
As a result of the social, political, and intellectual upheavals of the 1960s and
1970s, legal doctrine saw a revolution ranging from constitutional law to
statutory interpretation to the common law. Spurred by "critical legal studies"
in the law schools, legal philosophy entered a more uncertain and occasionally
radicalized era.'6 During this time of upheaval, aggressive actions by antitrust
enforcers in a variety of areas reached directly into the heart of trademark law.
Trademarks came under renewed attack as inherently "anticompetitive" and as
mechanisms for preserving the market power of entrenched economic
interests. 17
The tension between trademark protection and competition reached a
breaking point in the 1970s with the filing of the ReaLemon case.18 This FTC
enforcement action initially sought compulsory, royalty-free licensing of the
trademark "ReaLemon" on the ground that use of the mark was anticompetitive
because it allegedly maintained the monopoly position of Borden, Inc., in the
concentrated lemon juice market. 9 Such a frontal assault on trademarks had
never been made by any enforcement agency before the 1970s. The antitrust
laws are designed to promote and protect competition, and the use of the
antitrust laws to directly challenge the validity of trademarks sent shivers
through the community of trademark owners.2° In 1979, it appeared that the
future of trademark protection was in jeopardy or at least that trademark
protection might be denied in any instance where trademarks were found to
assist in the maintenance of monopoly power by any trademark holder. With
that ominous prospect, the 1970s drew to a close.
14. Act of July 5, 1946, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
15. See McClure, supra note 1, at 341, 344-45.
16. See generally ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
17. McClure, supra note 1, at 348.
18. Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 669-72 (1978) (reproducing complaint filed by F.T.C. on July 2,
1974).
19. McClure, supra note 1, at 348-53.
20. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Penalty?, 67
TRADEMARK REP. 197 (1977).
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III
POST-1970S TRADEMARK DEVELOPMENTS
A. Recent Developments in the Trademark/Antitrust Interface
1. The Aftermath of ReaLemon: A Retreat from Antitrust Attacks on
Trademarks. In retrospect, it now appears that the widespread concerns of
holders of trademarks in the 1970s that resulted from the vigorous FIC antitrust
enforcement actions, were unfounded. ReaLemon did not represent the
beginning of a trend, but rather the high-water mark for the attack on
trademarks as allegedly "anticompetitive." No similar antitrust claims have
since been brought by the FTC or the Department of Justice. Therefore,
ReaLemon can now be seen as the furthest advance of a radical and potentially
revolutionary attack on trademarks as anticompetitive. Moreover, the FTC
attacks on trademarks in the 1970s represented not just the furthest advance of
an economic attack on trademarks and advertising generally, but the beginning
of a counter-assault led by the Chicago School to create an economic
justification for trademarks.
The ReaLemon complaint was filed by the FTC in 1974.21 In 1976, the
administrative law judge ("AL") found that Borden had unlawfully monopo-
lized the processed lemon juice market and ordered Borden to grant a ten-year
license of its "ReaLemon" trademark to any competitor virtually royalty-free.
2
The ALJ recommendation to require royalty-free licensing of a valid trademark
as a remedy for monopolization prompted an outcry of criticism from trademark
holders and the trademark bar.23 What was also unsettling to trademark
holders was the ALJ's reasoning for recommending compulsory trademark
licensing: "The heart of the monopoly power preserved and maintained by
respondent Borden lies in the ReaLemon trademark and its dominant market
position. For competition to enter the processed lemon juice industry, the
barrier to entry which inheres in the ReaLemon trademark must be eliminat-
ed. "
24
The ALJ's recommendation in ReaLemon demonstrated the acceptance of
the economic theories of economist Edward Chamberlin that strong trademarks
supported by persuasive advertising could lead to product differentiation and
high barriers to entry that maintain monopoly power.2 5
21. Borden, 92 F.T.C. at 669.
22. Id. at 672-778 (reproducing initial decision of Aug. 19, 1976). "In a 'monopolization' case,
adequate relief must put an end to the monopoly position, and break up or render impotent the
monopoly power found to have been preserved and maintained in violation of law." Id. at 774.
23. McCarthy, supra note 20.
24. Borden, 92 F.T.C. at 774.
25. See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 11.
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The final order of the FTC in 1978, however, stopped short of ordering
licensing of the ReaLemon trademark as a remedy but left the door open to
such a remedy in an appropriate case.26 The FTC's opinion did find that
Borden had unlawfully monopolized the processed lemon juice market by
selective geographic predatory pricing made possible by promotion of its
trademark.27 The Commission held the following:
Borden, on the other hand, had the enormous market advantage conferred by the
ReaLemon trademark and its magnetic pull on the consumer.... [O]nly the market
power inherent in the ReaLemon trademark enabled Borden to manipulate price
differentials and discriminate among customers in different areas to maximize its
advantage over other producers."
The FTC's final order continued to meet with criticism from the trademark
bar.29
The Sixth Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision of the FTC in 1982.30
Although the court affirmed the FTC's finding of a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act,31 on the basis of predatory pricing,
the court also accepted the FTC's view that promotion of a dominant trademark
could be anticompetitive:
A highly successful brand name and product differentiation achieved through extensive
advertising over the years, standing alone, does not create a presumption of monopoly
power. When a seller possesses an overwhelmingly dominant share of the market,
however, and differentiates its product from others through a recognized and
extensively advertised brand name, thereby enabling the seller to control prices or
unreasonably restrict competition, then monopoly power may be found to exist....
The evidence indicated ReaLemon's successfully differentiated brand name, extensive
advertising and ability to command a premium price also acted to some degree as a
barrier to entry into the processed lemon juice market.32
The dissenting opinion in the ReaLemon case succinctly summarized the
opposing view that mere promotion of a trademark, even by a monopolist, is
not an antitrust violation:
Advertising is not a use of monopoly power. Successfully promoting one's product is
the epitome of the "business acumen" that Grinnell states is not monopolization....
It is not a violation of the antitrust laws for a monopolist to take advantage of a
consumer preference at the expense of its competitors."33
26. Borden, 92 F.T.C. at 778-833 (final order to cease and desist). In a separate opinion,
Commission Chairman Pertschuk favored ordering "some form of trademark relief" because "[t]he
power inherent in the ReaLemon trademark, and the price premium it permitted, are the root of
Borden's monopoly power." Id. at 809, 813.
27. Id. at 803-05.
28. Id. at 804.
29. J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks, Antitrust and the Federal Trade Commission, 13 JOHN
MARSHALL L. REV. 151 (1979).
30. Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 461 U.S. 940 (1983).
31. Respectively, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); id. § 45.
32. Borden, 674 F.2d at 511-12.
33. Id. at 519-20 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also attacked the FTC's claim that the
strength of the ReaLemon trademark resulted from "spurious" product differentiation. "The primary
function of a brand name is to provide consumers an assurance of quality. It is quite rational for
consumers to pay extra for ReaLemon to minimize their risk of receiving inferior goods." Id. at 520
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With the change of administrations in 1981, newly appointed Republican
commissioners of the FTC took a different view of the ReaLemon case. The
new FTC chairman, James C. Miller III, requested the other commissioners to
support Borden's request for certiorari and order that the case be remanded to
the FTC.34 Ultimately, Borden and the FTC reached agreement on a modified
order with respect to Borden's pricing practice.35 At the request of the parties,
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit decision.36
Dissenting from the Commission's 3-2 vote to accept the settlement, Commis-
sioner Pertschuk (author of the 1978 order) stated that "this modified order
represents for all practical purposes an abandonment of the Commission's role
in policing predatory pricing by a monopolist. 3 7
The FTC's 1983 statement on the modified order approving settlement of
the FTC's ReaLemon case completely repudiated the reasoning of the 1978 final
order. The statement on the modified order was particularly critical of the 1978
order's treatment of trademark promotion and product differentiation. The
order "apparently viewed product differentiation as something pernicious in and
of itself., 31 The statement on the modified order emphasized that product
differentiation of established brands "also serve[s] important competitive
functions," particularly in reducing "the costs to consumers of becoming
informed about a brand's advantages and availability., 39 The FTC concluded
the following:
The Commission's [1978] decision did not adequately weigh the competitive
advantages of Borden's product differentiation and antitrust laws' promotion of
interbrand competition. Instead, it assumed that consumer preference for Borden
necessarily constituted an anticompetitive barrier protecting Borden's monopoly
position from erosion by new entrants .... Because the Commission's [1978] analysis
of Borden's brand advantage appears to be inconsistent with the purposes of the
antitrust laws to promote vigorous competition ... , the Commission can no longer
defend this aspect of its opinion.'
The separate statement of Commissioner George Douglas characterized the
1978 order as "an egregiously bad order founded on a tortured economic
treatment of advertising as an entry barrier.'41
The FTC's reversal of its position in the ReaLemon case followed closely on
the heels of the dismissal of the FTC's complaint in the Cereals case in 1982.42
In the Cereals case, the FTC had filed a complaint in 1972 alleging that the four
n.5.
34. 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 603 (Sept. 30, 1982).
35. [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,995 (Mar. 14, 1983).
36. Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 461 U.S. 940 (1983).
37. Borden, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1147, 1150 (1983) (contending that the Commission's "most significant
policy decision in this area has been to undercut [the 1978] order after it was affirmed by a court of
appeals").
38. [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,995, at 22,494 (Mar. 14, 1983).
39. Id. at 22,494-95.
40. Id. at 22,495.
41. Id. at 22,506.
42. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).
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major ready-to-eat cereal manufacturers had maintained an alleged "shared
monopoly" by "proliferating brands," "artificially differentiating similar
products," and "promoting trademarks through intensive advertising."'43 But
the ALJ dismissed the case on the ground that the evidence failed to substanti-
ate a shared monopoly theory.'
The FTC also dismissed the antitrust monopolization claims in the Maxwell
House case, in which General Foods Corporation was originally charged with
engaging in "excessive promotional activities" and "using a fighting brand' to
impede entry"45 in connection with the marketing of Maxwell House Coffee.
The FTC concluded that "[a]ccepting that real or perceived differences among
products can build a loyal following of consumers does not amount to an
acknowledgement of entry barriers."46 More pointedly, the FTC criticized any
concern that promotion of trademarks is anticompetitive: "The qualitative
differences among the products and the consumers' loyalty to certain brands in
the market for ground roast coffee do not indicate the kind of market power the
antitrust laws were intended to address., 47
The FTC's abandonment in the early 1980s of its prior position with respect
to the alleged anticompetitive effect of trademarks and brand differentiation
reflected more than merely a change in the political winds. The FTC's reversal
reflected a shift in dominant economic thinking toward the view espoused by
the "Chicago School" economists. The FTC began to reconsider the liberal
economic underpinnings of the ReaLemon case even before the Sixth Circuit's
affirmance.48 The FTC's shift in attitude reflected a change in the predominant
thinking of economists about the value of trademarks. 49
The FTC attacks on trademarks in the 1970s grew out of a Chamberlinian
model of "monopolistic competition" from the 1930s, refined by the "liberal
school" economists in the 1950s and 1960s." These attacks charged that
"persuasive" advertising and product differentiation formed barriers to entry.
As the anti-advertising economic theories gained currency, so did the potential
for antitrust attacks on the allegedly "anticompetitive" effect of trademark
43. Id at 8-16 (reproducing complaint filed on Apr. 26, 1972); see Layne E. Kruse, Deconcentration
and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200 (1978).
44. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. at 16-269 (reproducing initial decision of Sept. 1, 1981).
45. General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 332 (1984).
46. Id at 354.
47. Id. at 365.
48. See RICHARD CRASWELL, FTC OFFICE OF POL'Y PLANNING, FTC POLICY PLANNING ISSUES
PAPER: TRADEMARKS, CONSUMER INFORMATION AND BARRIERS TO COMPETITION 15 (1979)
(commenting that if trademarks create any barriers to entry, such barriers "exist only because
consumers prefer the brands with the favorable reputation and are willing to pay a higher price for
them").
49. See Yale Brozen, New FTC Policy From Obsolete Economic Doctrine, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 477
(1972).
50. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 11 (7th ed. 1956); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION:
THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 114-44 (1956); FREDERIC
M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970); Harold
Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 50 (1982).
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promotion.51 Led by Chicago School economists, an equally powerful body of
economic theory was developing to rebut the claim that advertising (and
therefore trademarks) distorts tastes, manipulates demand, and creates
anticompetitive barriers to entry." The filing of the ReaLemon and Cereals
cases brought the economic debate to a head. The Chicago School economists
contended that trademarks (and advertising) were actually pro-competitive
because they lower consumer search costs, facilitate entry by new competitors,
and generate quality-control incentives.53 Professor Bork argued forcefully that
advertising trademarked brands does not create anticompetitive barriers to
entry:
Current antitrust objections to advertising and promotion are incomprehensible, for
if there is one charge that cannot with justice be laid against these activities, it is the
allegation that they impair competition. They are, on the contrary, essential to
vigorous market rivalry. ... Theoretical considerations indicate, therefore, that
advertising and promotion cannot create artificial barriers to entry. The argument is
so clear that it should come as no surprise whatever to learn that empirical work
indicates the same conclusion. 4
Professor Brozen forcefully argued the position that trademarks are pro-
competitive:
These notions-that the cost of products to consumers is high because of advertising
and that advertising is a barrier to entry behind whose shelter firms behave
monopolistically-are both old and obsolete. They are being adopted by the FTC staff
as a basis for a complaint just at the time they are in the process of being discarded
in economic analysis as erroneous-as inconsistent with economic theory and as
unfounded."
Professor Scherer, a supporter of the FTC's attacks on trademarks, shot
back:
First, no amount of semantic waffling, by Posner or anyone else, can paper over the
fact that the possession of a well-received brand image is a form of monopoly power.
51. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interests: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols,
57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1183 (1948) ("[Ajdvertising is a potent device to distinguish a product from its
competitors, and to create a partial immunity from the chills and fevers of competition. The result of
successful differentiation is higher prices than would otherwise prevail."); Paul D. Scanlon, Oligopoly
and "Deceptive" Advertising: The Cereal Industry Affair, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 99 (1970);
Sara V. Dobb, Compulsory Trademark Licensure as a Remedy for Monopolization, 27 CATH. U. L.
REv. 589 (1977); William C. Holmes, Trademark Licensing as Structural Antitrust Relief: An Analytical
Framework, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 146-47 (1981) (arguing that without compulsory trademark
licensing, the effect would be "the competitive barriers raised by particularly strong trademarks
thwarting competition and thereby frustrating other antitrust remedies").
52. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF ch. 16 (1978);
Yale Brozen, Entry Barriers: Advertising and Product Differentiation, in INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION:
THE NEW LEARNING 115 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974) ("Much of the behavior we observe
fits the view that advertising is a means of entry and impeaches the view that it is a barrier."); Demsetz,
supra note 50, at 56; Thomas Nagle, Do Advertising Profitability Studies Really Show That Advertising
Creates a Barrier to Entry?, 24 J. L. & ECON. 333 (1981).
53. Brozen, supra note 49, at 479 ("[A]dvertising is a productive and pro-competitive activity,
substituting cheaply provided information for expensive search costs, rather than being a wasteful
activity producing monopolistic results.").
54. BORK, supra note 52, at 314-16.
55. Brozen, supra note 49, at 477-78.
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... Second, it seems to me that, at least in the consumer goods industries, image
advantages confer a quantitatively important form of monopoly power-perhaps the
most important .... It is only a slight exaggeration to say that powerful trademarks
could be opened up to competitive licensing at the stroke of a judicial pen.56
With the ascendancy of Chicago School economists and new lawyers at the
FTC, the economic arguments in favor of trademarks and advertising generally
carried the day.57  "The early 1980s, however, represented a dramatic
epistemological break in the legal treatment of advertising. Now, not only are
once respectable arguments thoroughly repudiated, but advertising has secured
a preferred and even privileged status in contemporary antitrust doctrine.
5 8
In the 1980s and 1990s, the conventional wisdom has accepted the Chicago
School economic and antitrust analysis favorable to advertising and trade-
marks.59 Without a viable economic theory,' the era of antitrust attacks on
trademarks as inherently anticompetitive has ended.
2. Trademarks and Recent Antitrust Developments Generally. The retreat
of antitrust enforcement agencies from the approach of ReaLemon is not
surprising in light of the general diminishment of antitrust enforcement in a
variety of areas since the 1970s. More significantly, a conservatism has taken
over antitrust law both at enforcement agencies and among courts and legal
scholars that reflects the ascendancy of the Chicago School law and economics
movement.
The Chicago School is an economic model of antitrust policy based on the
neoclassical market efficiency model.6' The Chicago School seeks to apply
price theory to antitrust law.62 Using the tools of price theory, the Chicago
56. Frederic M. Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat From Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974,
998-99 (1977); see Richard Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon
Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994 (1979).
57. George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 807,814-17 (1992) ("[T]he mere
fact that an industry is characterized by product differentiation ... need not mean that any firm has
market power in the antitrust sense .... [Successful differentiation] does not signify the kind of market
power the antitrust laws ought to be concerned about."); Clement G. Krouse, Brand Name as a Barrier
to Entry: The ReaLemon Case, 51 S. ECON. J. 495 (1984).
58. Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue,
1990 DUKE L.J. 321, 322 (1990) (describing the history of the economic and legal debate about the
competitive effects of advertising).
59. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.01[2]; Donald I. Baker, Compulsory Access to Network Joint
Ventures Under the Sherman Act: Rules or Roulette?, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 1099-1102 (1993); Lillian R.
BeVier, Competitors' Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in
the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 4-8 (1992) (describing the "widely but not universally shared
assumption that advertising plays a benign role in facilitating market transactions"); Dan Shanahan, The
Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly?, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 233 (1982).
60. A few economists continue to assert a view of trademarks contrary to the Chicago School. See
Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Non-Fungible Goods, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1987).
61. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 215 (1985).
62. Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 928 (1979)
(noting that the price theory model includes the assumptions that "businessmen are rational profit-
maximizers .... that demand curves slope downward, that an increase in the price of a product will
reduce the demand for its complement, that resources gravitate to the areas where they will earn the
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School posits that economic efficiency is the exclusive goal of antitrust law.
Professor Bork has best summarized the orthodox Chicago School position:
"The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve
allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to
produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." 63 In this model,
"[c]onsumer welfare ... permits consumers to define by their expression of
wants in the marketplace what things they regard as wealth."'
Although many of the positions of the Chicago School are controversial, the
influence of the Chicago School on antitrust law and policy is unquestioned.65
The impact of the Chicago School law and economics approach in changing
antitrust law has been well documented.66 The ascendancy of the Chicago
School has been at the expense of the Harvard School, industrial organization,
economists, and the Warren Court antitrust doctrines. 67  These industrial
organization economists focused heavily on the evils of oligopolistic markets,
product differentiation, industrial concentration, barriers to entry, and large firm
dominance.' In contrast, the Chicago School approach was that "firms cannot
in general obtain or enhance monopoly power by unilateral action" and that
"the focus of the antitrust laws should not be on unilateral action" but rather
on horizontal price-fixing cartels and horizontal mergers that create monopo-
lies. 69  Chicago School scholars were especially critical of the Warren Era
adoption of per se rules of antitrust illegality for unilateral conduct such as
predatory pricing and for vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance,
exclusive territorial restrictions, and tie-ins (requiring a buyer to buy a second
product as a condition for buying the first product).7°
The economic theories of the Chicago School ultimately came to influence
strongly not only the Justice Department and the FTC but also the federal
courts. The seminal case was the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Sylvania,
where the Court abandoned the per se rule of illegality for vertical territorial
restraints under the Sherman Act and adopted a flexible Rule of Reason to
highest return").
63. BORK, supra note 52, at 91 ("Allocative efficiency, as used here, refers to the placement of
resources in the economy, the question of whether resources are employed in tasks where consumers
value their output most. Productive efficiency refers to the effective use of resources by particular
firms. The idea of effective use ... encompasses much more than mere technical or plant-level
efficiency.").
64. Id. at 90.
65. Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 214-16.
66. Pete M. Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago
School, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 319; William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989).
67. See Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 217.
68. See JOE BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956); Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 218-19.
69. Posner, supra note 62, at 928-48 (contending that the views of the Harvard School and the
Chicago School had begun to converge as many of the assumptions of the Chicago School met general
acceptance).
70. Id at 926-27; BORK supra note 52, at 280-407.
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assess such a vertical restraint.7 The Sylvania decision adopted the Chicago
School approach that restraints on intrabrand competition were of lesser
concern because, by enhancing brand promotion, intrabrand restraints promote
interbrand competition among producers.72 The Supreme Court accepted the
argument that a vertical restraint imposed by a single manufacturer on dealers
is unlikely to have anticompetitive consequences because interbrand competition
confronting the manufacturer effectively checks the exploitation of intrabrand
market power. Consumers can readily substitute a different brand of the same
product.73 The Sylvania decision launched the Supreme Court and federal
antitrust law generally into an era in which the courts began to employ routinely
the economic analysis of efficiency, reconsider prior antitrust precedent, and
adopt the Rule of Reason (explicitly or implicitly) to assess many challenged
practices.74 Despite the great influence of the Chicago School, however, the
Supreme Court has not uniformly adopted its views on all antitrust issues, as
evidenced by the Court's 1992 decision in Kodak.75
The Chicago School approach to antitrust law has had an inevitable effect
on antitrust cases involving trademarks. As discussed infra, the implications of
Chicago School economics has also had an effect on substantive trademark law.
The most significant implication of the Chicago School analysis for trademarks
arises from its criticism of the view that advertising and promotion create
artificial barriers to entry.76 The Chicago School has adopted the view that "all
of the 'artificial barriers' complained of in antitrust are, in fact, activities that
create efficiency."77  The Chicago School argues that any market power
associated with a trademark is derived merely from the buyer's preference for
71. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
72. Id. at 52 n.19 (interbrand competition is the "primary concern of antitrust law"); see Richard
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
73. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
74. Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Business
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (limiting extent of per se prohibition of resale
price maintenance); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (approving
summary judgment on antitrust claims based on economically irrational conduct); Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (limiting scope of per se rule
for concerted refusals to deal); Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)
(adopting rule of reason for exclusive contracts, and inquiring into market power for tie-ins); see Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 9-14 (1984).
75. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (ruling that
nonstructural market power justified reversal of summary judgment in tying case); see Robert H. Lande,
Chicago Takes it on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak
World, 62 ANTITRUsT L.J. 193 (1993); M. Sean Royall, Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 445 (1995).
76. BORK, supra note 52, at 314-20.
77. Id at 196 ("The Chicago School's view of advertising is especially noteworthy because of the
importance that advertising had assumed in the Harvard thinking on antitrust."); Posner, supra note 62,
at 930.
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the trademarked product and, thus, is not an anticompetitive barrier to entry
with which the antitrust laws should be concerned.7"
Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act provides a defense to trademark
infringement whenever it is established "[t]hat the mark has been or is being
used to violate the antitrust laws of the United States., 79  This defense of
antitrust trademark "misuse" has been rarely invoked because the courts
interpret the Lanham Act as requiring "proof that the mark itself has been the
basic and fundamental vehicle required and used to accomplish the violation,"
as opposed to "proof of a collateral violation."'
Until the ReaLemon case, courts generally did not find that the mere
aggressive use and promotion of trademarks could itself constitute monopoliza-
tion or attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act."' But
the Supreme Court has struck down territorial trademark licensing agreements
that were held to constitute horizontal agreements among competitors to divide
markets.8
2
The most frequently litigated antitrust cases involving trademarks have been
tying cases. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or
tied) product. 8 3 Since at least the International Salt decision in 1947, tie-ins
have been held to be per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 An
essential element to establish an illegal tying arrangement has traditionally been
proof of sufficient economic power in the tying product to impose restrictions
sufficient to restrain competition in the tied product market.8 5 In other words,
the seller must have sufficient economic power over the tying product to be able
to compel buyers to purchase the tied product. The Supreme Court in some
early cases adopted the presumption of market power in the tying product
where it was either patented or copyrighted. 6
78. BORK, supra note 52, at 310; Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition:
Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1994).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1994).
80. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified
on other grounds, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971). Compare Phi Delta
Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (allowing antitrust
misuse defense where trademark used directly in antitrust violation) with Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard
Johnson Co., 386 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (striking misuse defense where complaint asserted
collateral antitrust activities with respect to trademarked goods); see David Hill, Antitrust Violations as
a Defense to Trademark Infringement, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 148 (1981).
81. Drop Dead Co. v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 95 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 907 (1964) (promoting trademarks constituted mere "aggressive competition"); see 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 6, § 31.26[3][a], at 31-143.
82. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
(1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). But see VMG Enters., Inc.
v. F. Quesada & Franco, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 648, 653-59 (D.P.R. 1992).
83. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
84. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
85. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6.
86. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) ("Requisite economic power is presumed
when the tying product is patented or copyrighted.").
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 59: No. 2
In 1971, the Ninth Circuit extended tying analysis to trademarks in Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc.17 In holding that a franchisor may not condition a license
to use its trademark on the franchisees' reciprocal purchase of supplies and
equipment, the Ninth Circuit found that sufficient market power could be
presumed to exist when the tying product is a trademark.88 The lower courts
subsequently split on whether trademarks could be the basis for a tying claim.8 9
Adherents of the Chicago School, who doubted that tying arrangements should
even be unlawful,9" were particularly critical of any presumption that a
trademark could be the basis for market power in a tying product.91
In 1984, the Supreme Court narrowly reaffirmed the per se rule against tying
in the Jefferson Parish case, and it demanded real economic proof of market
power in tying products.92 Since Jefferson Parish, the lower courts have
consistently refused to hold that trademarks themselves confer market power
for purposes of tying arrangements. 93  Without even mentioning Siegel, the
Ninth Circuit subsequently held in 1987 that "a prestigious trademark is not
itself persuasive evidence of economic power. . .. Market power, if any, is
derived from the product, not from the name or symbol as such. 94
87. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
88. The court reasoned that "[j]ust as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offering
the distinctive product on the market, so the registered trade-mark presents a legal barrier against
competition." Id. at 50.
89. Compare Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1015 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972) ("The Copeland trade-mark ... is persuasive evidence of significant
market leverage.") with Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974),
Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981) (holding
that the McDonald's franchise was not separable into two products), and Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods,
Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the court had not gone "so far as to presume that the
mere existence of a trademark in and of itself supplies economic power sufficient to constitute an
antitrust violation").
90. Posner, supra note 62, at 926; BORK, supra note 52, at 363-81 ("A review of the cases and the
economics of tying and reciprocity, then, leads inescapably to the conclusion that the law in this field
is unjustified and is itself inflicting harm upon consumers.").
91. William Hensley, Franchise Tying: Gauging the Economic Power of a Trademark, U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 405 (1981); Warren Lavey, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks as Sources of Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 433, 448-51, 454-55 (1982) ("Patents, copyrights, and
trademarks are forms of intellectual property; they are often not economic monopolies. Describing
them as monopolies can impair proper economic analysis in antitrust cases as well as proper economic
analysis of the laws granting intellectual property."); William Montgomery, The Presumption of
Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1140 (1985).
92. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984). Four justices, in
consideration of the potential pro-competitive effects of tying arrangements, would have analyzed the
restraints under the Rule of Reason. Id. at 32-34.
93. See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 743 F. Supp. 353, 359
(E.D. Pa.), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 868 (1992); Grappone v. Subaru of New England, 858 F.2d 792, 798 (1st Cir. 1988); Will v.
Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 673 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129
(1986).
94. Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 870 (1988).
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The leading antitrust treatise, consistent with the Chicago School's general
attitude toward trademarks and barriers to entry, has essentially adopted the
view that trademarks are not anticompetitive:
A trademark is even less potent than a copyright in bringing its owner market power.
It protects nothing more than one's name, allowing rivals to copy every detail of a
rival's business (short of passing oneself off as another). While a defendant might
dominate a market because of the reputation enjoyed by its name, nothing prevents
rivals from offering equivalent products and establishing a matching reputation.
Barriers to entry may exist, but the legal protection afforded the defendant's name is
not what bars entry.... Nor would trademarks indicate power often enough to be a
convenient surrogate for proof of power. In sum, the holder of a protected trademark
may enjoy market power, but such power cannot be inferred from the trademark
alone.95
In 1995, the federal antitrust enforcement agencies published intellectual
property guidelines intended to set forth the federal government's enforcement
policies related to licensing of intellectual property.96 While they do not cover
the antitrust treatment of trademarks, the Guidelines note that "the same
general antitrust principles that apply to other forms of intellectual property
apply to trademarks as well." 97 The Guidelines are significant because of their
generally favorable and supportive attitude toward intellectual property rights.
In its statement of general principles, the Guidelines announce that "the
Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the
antitrust context," and "the Agencies recognize that intellectual property
licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is
generally pro-competitive." 9 The Guidelines take a relatively benign view of
the exclusive rights accorded to owners of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets:
"Intellectual property is thus neither particularly free from scrutiny under the
antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect under them."99 In a seeming departure
from the FTC's attitude in the 1970s, the Guidelines make clear that the mere
possession of an intellectual property right will not give rise to a presumption
of market power and cannot in itself be the basis of an antitrust violation: "If
a patent or other form of intellectual property does confer market power, that
market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws."'" Although the
Guidelines do not address trademark antitrust issues, it is clear that the federal
enforcement agencies view all intellectual property as generally pro-competitive:
"The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common
purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare."' '1 Thus,
95. X PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW I 1737e (1995).
96. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property § 1.0 (1995), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,132, at 20,733 (Apr. 6,
1995) [hereinafter Guidelines].
97. Id. § 1.0 n.1 (noting that "product-differentiation issues ... typically arise with respect to
trademarks").
98. Id. § 2.0.
99. Id. § 2.1.
100. Id. § 2.2.
101. Id. § 1.0.
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the Guidelines are significant because they state the government's antitrust
policy in support of intellectual property. Legal commentators have also noted
the marked shift in antitrust law in the 1980s and 1990s favorable to all forms
of intellectual property.1°2
B. Expanded Protection in Traditional Trademark Infringement Cases: The
Ascendancy of Chicago School Law and Economics Theory
Trademark infringement cases have shown the slow evolution of legal
doctrine since the 1970s. As trademark law matures and as the courts develop
precedent interpreting the Lanham Act, established legal doctrines tend to take
on a certain sanctity. 3 Thus, "likelihood of confusion" between two marks
by consumers has become the hallmark concept litigated in trademark
infringement cases." Likewise, in determining the initial validity of a
trademark, the traditional trademark legal doctrine assessing marks as
generic/descriptive/suggestive/arbitrary has not changed substantially.1 °5
However, because such decisions concentrate so heavily on the facts of a
particular case, and because this legal doctrine tends to become formalistic and
conceptualistic, there is much room for judicial discretion. As legal realism has
taught us, judicial discretion is exercised within the context of broader political
and intellectual trends of the times. Therefore, as society and the courts have
become more politically conservative, the trend in infringement cases has been
toward greater protection for trademarks within the general doctrinal confines
of the Lanham Act. The theoretical underpinning for expanded protection has
been the economic theories of the Chicago School.
1. The Chicago School Defense of Trademarks. Just as the Chicago School
theorists have come to dominate thinking in antitrust law, so has the Chicago
School influenced the development of basic trademark law. Even though many
courts do not explicitly assess economic issues in deciding trademark cases,"
102. See XI PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL, ANTITRUST LAW 1783 (1996); James B. Kobak, Jr., Running
the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST
L.J. 341, 349 (1996) ("Intellectual property rights and their enforcement are no longer regarded as
inherently evil. They are no longer seen as irreconcilably inconsistent with the goals of antitrust.");
Norman E. Rosen, Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Pendulum: Recent Developments at the
Interface Between the Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1994).
103. The promulgation in 1993 of the Third Restatement has served to give trademark law the
appearance of being largely settled. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
104. See Patricia Kaeding, Clearly Erroneous Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The
Likelihood of Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1291, 1292-93 (1992);
see, e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1225 (2d Cir.
1987) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
820 (1961)); New West Corp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979).
105. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 9-15 (1995) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
106. The Restatement has recognized the general principle that trademark infringement actions are
an exception to the general principle of non-liability for injury caused by one competitor as a result of
free competition and that trademark law requires a balancing of the public interest:
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the Chicago School approach has had an undeniable impact on trademark cases
across the board. In most instances, that impact has been supportive of existing
trademark legal doctrine and trademark protection generally.
The approach of the Chicago School to trademarks was reflected judicially
in two Seventh Circuit opinions in 1985 authored by two judges who are leaders
of the Chicago School, Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner. In the
first case, Scandia Down,"°7 Judge Easterbrook took the opportunity to
describe succinctly the economic benefit that the Chicago School sees in
trademarks:
Trademarks help consumers to select goods. By identifying the source of the goods,
they convey valuable information to consumers at lower costs. Easily identified
trademarks reduce the costs consumers incur in searching for what they desire, and the
lower the costs of search the more competitive the market. A trademark also may
induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality products and to adhere to a
consistent level of quality.1 '
In Scandia, the Seventh Circuit explained aspects of traditional trademark
doctrine in economic terms. The first issue addressed by the Court was whether
the words "Down Shop[pe]" used with Scandia's logo of a goose was "merely
descriptive" (in which case protection would be denied) or "arbitrary" or
"suggestive" (in which case Scandia's mark would be protected)."m The
Seventh Circuit sided with Scandia and affirmed the lower court's assessment
of the evidence that the mark was protectable. The second issue in the case was
whether the trademark of the competitor, Euroquilt, was "confusingly similar"
to Scandia's trademark."' Again, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's
determination of likelihood of confusion. Significantly, Judge Easterbrook
analyzed these issues in economic terms: "Confusingly similar marks make
consumers' task in searching for products harder.""' Judge Easterbrook drew
the comparison to antitrust cases "where retailers may try to take a free ride on
the services provided by their rivals.""' By enjoining trademark infringement,
the "free rider" effect could be prevented. However, Judge Easterbrook
emphasized that a trademark holder could not obtain rights to merely
The rules governing the protection of trademarks must also be responsive to the public interest
in fostering vigorous competition. In defining protectable subject matter and in delineating
the scope of exclusive rights, the law cannot neglect the legitimate interests of other
competitors. In some cases the recognition of exclusive rights in favor of a particular seller
may undermine the ability of other sellers to communicate useful information to consumers
or deprive competitors of access to product features necessary for effective competition.
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 105, § 1 cmt. e.
107. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147
(1986).
108. Id. at 1429.
109. Id. at 1430.
110. Id. at 1431.
111. Id. at 1430.
112. Id.
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descriptive words because that would constitute "a free ride on the lan-
guage.511
3
In W T Rogers,114 the Seventh Circuit reversed a jury verdict for the
defendant, a manufacturer of plastic stacking letter trays who sued for
trademark infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.115  The court
considered the limits of the "functionality doctrine" in trademark law. This
doctrine falls right at the intersection of trademark protection and competition.
[T]he concept of functionality is intended to screen out from the protection of
trademark law certain design features even if they have become so far identified with
the manufacturer of a particular brand that consumers may be confused about the
origin of the good if another producer is allowed to adopt the feature."
6
Traditionally, the rule has stipulated that functional features may be protected
as trademarks "unless competition is unduly hindered" thereby. 7 Judge
Posner analyzed trademark law and the functionality defense in economic terms
using a Chicago School approach.118
The reason for this screen or filter [of the functionality doctrine] becomes apparent
once the purpose of trademark protection is understood .... The purpose is to reduce
the cost of information to consumers by making it easy for them to identify the
products or producers with which they have had either good experiences, so that they
want to keep buying the product (or buying from the producer), or bad experiences,
so that they want to avoid the product or the producer in the future.
In W T Rogers, Judge Posner announced that "competition is not impaired
by giving each manufacturer a perpetual 'monopoly' of his identifying mark" if
he has chosen a "distinctive" trademark where the available names are "for all
practical purposes infinite.""' 9 Judge Posner noted that "generic" names are
not subject to trademark protection because the manufacturer there "is trying
to monopolize a scarce input, for there usually are only one or two words in
common usage to describe a given product (such as 'car' and 'automobile').""'
Likewise, inclusion in a trademark of a design feature that is intrinsic to the
entire product will result in a denial of protection under the "functionality
doctrine." In such a case, "that firm would have, not an identifying mark, but
a product monopoly, and a product monopoly not for a term of years as under
the patent laws but forever."'' In that case, competition would be hindered
because "a functional feature is one which competitors would have to spend
money not to copy but to design around."' Judge Posner concluded by
placing this issue of trademark law in the starkest competitive terms:
113. Id.
114. W. T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
116. W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338.
117. Id.; see Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 81-93 (1982).
118. W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338.
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[T]he jury has to determine whether the feature for which trademark protection is
sought is something that other producers of the product in question would have to
have as part of the product in order to be able to compete effectively in the
market-in other words, in order to give consumers the benefits of a competitive
market--or whether it is the kind of merely incidental feature which gives the brand
some individual distinction but which producers of competing brands can readily do
without.'
Significantly, these Chicago School judicial opinions purport to expressly
reject a formalistic or conceptualistic approach to trademark protection.
Although finding in favor of protection and essentially justifying pre-existing
legal doctrines, the Seventh Circuit took pains to avoid reaching a decision
deductively from the concepts and language familiar to trademark lawyers. In
its place, the Seventh Circuit applied a very pragmatic economic analysis.124
We have said before that "arbitrary," "suggestive," and the other words in the
vocabulary of trademark law may confuse more readily than they illuminate... , a
caution litigants should take seriously before arguing cases so that everything turns on
which word we pick. It is better to analyze trademark cases in terms of the functions
of trademarks.
So the ultimate legacy of the legal realists' attack on formalism is that the
"law and economics" analysis of Chicago School judges provides a new and
sounder theoretical underpinning for traditional trademark legal doctrine. What
would the legal realists of the 1930s think if they could have foreseen that their
attack on formalist conceptualism in trademark law would eventually result in
an expanded protection for trademarks in the form of fact-based economic
analysis of the functions of trademarks? The Chicago School judges have taken
to heart the legal realists' critique that cases should not be decided by
deductively reasoning from simple rules or words."u So instead of purporting
to reason deductively from such open-textured or vague trademark rules
defining what is "generic" or "descriptive" or "suggestive," the Chicago School
judges are intent on "looking behind" the facade of legal trademark doctrine to
assess the purposes and policies underlying trademark law in economic terms.
The irony is that a somewhat radical movement such as legal realism has had
its mode of legal reasoning borrowed and made the basis for a conservative
economic approach to decisionmaking in trademark law. Similarly, in antitrust
law, the Chicago School approach may also be seen as the descendant of legal
123. Id.; see Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that trademark
protection is not anticompetitive).
124. Scandia, 772 F.2d at 1431 n.3.
125. "[O]ne ... sees interesting cases slaughtered every day by lawyers who parrot the language of
older cases rather than figuring out the functional considerations." Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 118 (1990); see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949) ("It is important that the mechanism of legal reasoning
should not be concealed by [the] pretense ... that the law is a system of known rules applied by a
judge; the pretense has long been under attack."); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics,
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 930-33
(1996); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986).
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realism, even though the Chicago scholars challenged formalism "by applying
a brand of economic theory that expressed more rigorously the same laissez-
faire vision that the realists had attacked decades before.,
126
These Chicago School judicial decisions have been accompanied by a series
of journal articles in support of the economic theory of trademark protection.
The most influential articles, The Economics of Trademark Law and Trademark
Law: An Economic Perspective, were by two of the leading lights of the Chicago
School, William Landes and Richard Posner. 27 The appeal of the Chicago
School economic theory is that it has the capacity to provide an all-encompass-
ing and unifying approach to virtually every legal issue in trademark law. The
function of trademark law is reduced to a single goal of economic efficiency to
maximize wealth."2 Much of existing trademark legal doctrine can then be
"explained" in terms of the economic function of trademarks. This economic
approach places less emphasis on other ideas that have historically been viewed
as animating goals of trademark law, such as commercial morality, preventing
consumer deception, and protecting a trademark owner's business goodwill from
misappropriation. The Chicago School approach purports to subsume these
varied ideas in a single economic theory.
The general approach of the Chicago School has been widely accepted,
partly as a result of the absence of any countervailing arguments by the so-
called Harvard School of economic theory. Without a countervailing economic
theory, such as that proposed by Edward Chamberlin in the 1930s and advanced
later by Harvard School economists through the 1960s, the Chicago School
analysis remains largely unchallenged.' 29 The leading treatise summarizing
126. See William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 4
(1995).
127. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK
REP. 267, 271-72 (1988); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 290 (1987); see John F. Coverdale, Note, Trademarks and Generic
Words: An Effect-On-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868 (1984); Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L.
Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323 (1980); Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf,
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 911 (1990);
Peter E. Mims, Note, Promotional Goods and Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of
Trademarks, 63 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1984).
128. "The basic function of law in an economic or wealth-maximization perspective is to alter
incentives." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JuSTICE 75 (1981).
129. Not all economists share the Chicago School view that the law's function is the maximization
of wealth. POSNER, supra note 128, at 48-115. The Chicago School approach to law and economics has
been criticized on the ground that it "ignores the broader economic understanding of the legal system
as an order derived from the adjudication of individual claims rather than from a public policy
blueprint." Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,
12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 303 (1989). Palmer has argued that the Chicago School is wrong to view
intellectual property law as functioning to achieve a specific outcome of efficiency and wealth
maximization, instead of allowing the legal order to develop rules spontaneously case by case as courts
attempt to do justice and recognize rights in each case. Id. at 263, 303-04. And the protection of
patents and copyrights has generated greater debate among economists than the protection of
trademark rights. Compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) with Palmer, supra, at 263 ("[P]atents and copyrights are
forms, not of legitimate property rights, but of illegitimate state-granted monopoly.").
[Vol. 59: No. 2
Page 13: Spring 1996] RECENT HISTORY OF TRADEMARKS
trademark law has essentially embraced the Chicago School view of the value
of trademarks for the competitive market in identifying the source of the goods,
encouraging maintenance of quality products, and reducing consumers' search
costs. 130  In short, existing trademark legal doctrine is seen as providing a
solution to the tension between protection of trademarks and free competition,
and resolves that tension either by denying the existence of any conflict or by
determining that existing exceptions to rules of protection are sufficient to
accommodate any tension.
Supporters of the economic approach to trademark law differ as to whether
that approach is consistent with a "property rights" view of trademarks.
Professor Carter expressed the view that the economic goals of trademark law
are fundamentally an utilitarian argument for efficiency. 3' Judge Easterbrook
argues for the libertarian position that the economic function of trademarks is
simply an aspect of property rights.'32 Easterbrook's view suggests that an
economic approach to trademark law is capable of eliminating any conflict
between competition and property rights, policy and morality, utilitarianism and
natural rights.
2. The Supreme Court Embraces the Economic Justification for Trademarks.
In traditional trademark infringement cases under the Lanham Act,'33 the
trend, to the extent any can be discerned in the 1980s and 1990s, is toward
greater protection of trademarks and expanded standards for what symbols and
devices can qualify as trademarks. The judicial attitude toward trademarks is
best exemplified by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the
Lanham Act. In its relatively few trademark cases in the past twenty years, the
high Court has embraced a relatively hospitable view of trademarks and
trademark protection.M
In Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., the Supreme Court
expanded trademark protection by holding that even a trademark that was
"merely descriptive" would support an infringement action where the trademark
had become "incontestable" under the Lanham Act.135  The plaintiff had a
registered service mark, "Park 'N Fly," that it used in the operation of long-
term parking lots near airports. The service mark had achieved incontestable
130. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.01[2].
131. Stephen L. Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 101 (1990).
132. Easterbrook, supra note 125, at 112.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
134. In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982), the court noted that
it was undisputed that pharmacists who mislabeled generic drugs with the plaintiff's registered
trademark violated § 32 of the Lanham Act, although the Court declined to extend liability vicariously
to manufacturers of the generic drugs. In discussing the pharmacists' mislabeling, Justice O'Connor
noted that "blatant trademark infringement inhibits competition" because "the infringer deprives the
owner of the good will which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain" and because infringement
"deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish the goods of competing manufacturers." Id. at 854
n. 14.
135. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
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status under the Lanham Act 36 because the mark had been registered and had
been in continuous use for five consecutive years without any decisions adverse
to the registration. The owner of the "Park 'N Fly" trademark brought an
infringement action to enjoin use by a competitor of the words "Park and Fly."
The Court broadly construed the incontestability provision of the Lanham Act,
preventing the defendant from establishing that "Park 'N Fly" was merely
descriptive of the product and had not acquired "secondary meaning." '137 In
the absence of the incontestability provision, such a merely descriptive mark
(one that merely describes the qualities and characteristics of the good or
service) would not be entitled to trademark protection.
What is impressive about the Court's opinion in Park 'N Fly is that the
Court was relatively unconcerned with the potential anticompetitive effects of
allowing a merely descriptive trademark to receive protection. The Court
concluded that the legislative history of the Lanham Act supported the view
that "[nlational protection of trademarks is desirable ... because trademarks
foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer
the benefits of good reputation., 138  The Court brushed aside any concern
about the anticompetitive effect of taking "from the public domain language
that is merely descriptive."' 39  The Court dismissed any concerns about
"'commercial monopolization"' of descriptive language by indicating that a mark
could be challenged at any time "if it becomes generic" and that any threat to
economic competition could always be challenged under the trademark misuse
provision of Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act" that "provides a defense
on the grounds that the mark is being used to violate federal antitrust laws."''
Instead, by allowing an infringement action for a merely descriptive mark, the
Court implicitly indicated its view that trademark protection in this context
would have minimal anticompetitive consequences and perhaps even serve a
pro-competitive purpose.'42
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,"'3 the Supreme Court in 1992 brought
trade dress law into the mainstream of trademark law. Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act" has been interpreted to create a federal cause of action for
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b) (1994).
137. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 205.
138. Id. at 198.
139. Id. at 201.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1994).
141. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 201.
142. Although the Court justified its results in terms of the economic benefits of trademarks, the
Court's Park 'N Fly opinion has been criticized as going beyond the economic rationale for trademark
protection. See Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 953, 986-87 (1986).
143. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
144. Section 1125 states, in relevant part:
Any person who shall ... use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or
containers for goods ... any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same .... shall be liable to a civil action
by ... any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such
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trade dress infringement.'45 The Court noted in Two Pesos that there was no
reason to apply to trade dress analysis requirements that differ from those
generally applicable to trademark infringement suits. The Court held that the
trade dress of a Mexican food restaurant, consisting of architectural and interior
design elements, was protected by the Lanham Act. 6
The Court held that the defendant, Two Pesos, infringed on Taco Cabana's
trade dress by adopting a motif very similar to that described as plaintiff Taco
Cabana's trade dress. The Court's holding rested in part on the presumed pro-
competitive purpose of the Lanham Act. According to the Court,
[pirotection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the Act's purpose to
secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability
of consumers to distinguish among competing producers. National protection of
trademarks is desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition
and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good
reputation.
1 47
Thus, the Court emphatically endorsed the view that trademarks are pro-com-
petitive. From this point of view, the Court had no difficulty in expanding the
boundaries of trademark protection to vaguely defined trade dress uses."
The Court's willingness to protect a restaurant's motif on the ground that such
protection is pro-competitive stands in stark contrast to the FTC's attack in the
1970s on the registered trademark ReaLemon on the antitrust grounds that
protection of that mark for lemon juice was anticompetitive. 149
Prior to Two Pesos, trade dress protection under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act had become "one of the most important weapons in the continuing
effort by businesses to distinguish their products from those of their competitors
false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
145. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821,830-32 (11th Cir.
1982); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1981).
146. Plaintiff Taco Cabana described its trade dress as
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts,
bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior and exterior areas with the
interior patio capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage doors.
The stepped exterior of the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint
and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765.
147. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3-5 (1946)).
148. While the Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to expand trade dress and trademark
protection, it has hesitated to expressly adopt an analogy between intellectual property rights and
ownership of ordinary property. The Court has avoided an overly conceptual or formalistic treatment
of patents, trademarks, and copyright as "property." In Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985),
the Court refused to hold that the National Stolen Property Act applied to the interstate transportation
of "bootleg" phonorecords. The Court held that the rights of a copyright holder are "distinct" from
the rights of owners of other kinds of property. Id. at 217. The Court avoided the easy analogy
between intellectual property and ordinary property. "Thus, the property rights of the copyright holder
have a character distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple 'goods, wares, [or]
merchandise,' for the copyright holder's dominion is subjected to precisely defined limits." Id.
149. Two Pesos has been criticized as taking trademark protection into the realm of copyright and
patents. See Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of
Product Trade Dress under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2037 (1993).
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and to combat likelihood of confusion.""15 The Two Pesos case followed the
trade dress trend started by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Truck Equipment
Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.5' In Fruehauf, the court held that protection
against product imitation, parts of which were non-functional, 15 2 "furthered the
congressional policy of fostering fair competition and the policy of rewarding
the creation of goodwill."'53 Thus, in applying traditional trademark protec-
tion policies in the area of trade dress, Fruehauf underscored the pro-competi-
tive nature of trademarks. Two Pesos accepted this point of view.
The willingness of the Supreme Court to expand trademark protection under
the Lanham Act was illustrated most recently by the Court's 1995 opinion in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.'54 In Qualitex, the Court held that
the Lanham Act permitted the registration of a trademark that consisted of the
use of a color alone. The Court reinstated judgment for the plaintiff in its
infringement claim against a competitor that had used a similar shade of green-
gold on dry cleaning press pads. The plaintiff had used the same shade of color
on its pads since the 1950s and obtained trademark registration for the color on
press pads in 1991. The Court held that dicta in its pre-Lanham Act cases
against use of color alone as a trademark need not be followed because the
Lanham Act "liberalized the common law" to dispense with technicalities.'55
More significantly, the Court assessed whether allowing color alone as a
trademark was inconsistent with "the basic objectives of trademark law."' 56
In doing so, the Court openly embraced the competitive value of trademarks
generally. The Court concluded that the "source-distinguishing ability of a
mark" permits it to serve two basic purposes: (1) makes purchasing decisions
by potential customer easier by assuring the customer that the item with the
mark is the item "that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past," and (2) assures
a producer that it "will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated
with a desirable product."'57  The result, the Court concluded, was that
trademark law "encourage[s] the production of quality products., 158
Implicit in the Supreme Court's opinion in Qualitex is the acceptance of the
Chicago School analysis of the competitive benefits of trademarks. The Court
cited with approval the influential articles by leaders of the Chicago School that
emphasized the pro-competitive benefits of the use of trademarks.'59 In short,
by accepting the Chicago School analysis of the competitive benefits of
150. 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 7.02[7], at 7-68.21 (1995).
151. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 114-24 for an explanation of the functionality doctrine.
153. 1 GILSON, supra note 150, § 7.02[7], at 7-68.22.
154. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
155. Id. at 1307.
156. Id. at 1303.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting 1 MCCARTHY supra note 6, § 2.01[(2)], at 2-3).
159. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303-04 (citing Landes & Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law,
supra note 127, at 271-72; Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, supra note
127, at 290.
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trademarks, the Court was more willing to expand trademark protection to
include a mere color as a trademark.16°
Thus, after years of silence on trademark issues, the Supreme Court's
relative activism during the past decade has sent a strong signal to the lower
federal courts that trademark protection should be broadly enforced. 1' More
important than merely the holdings in these recent Supreme Court cases is the
Court's open embrace of the Chicago School economics justification for
trademarks. Just as in antitrust law, Chicago School economic theories have
provided the unifying basis for reconciling divergent legal doctrines.
C. Legislative Expansion of Protection for Trademarks: The Revival of
Trademarks as Property Rights
As traditional trademark law is expanding gradually in the courts on a case-
by-case basis, the underlying trends in trademark law are even more apparent
in the statutory expansion of trademark law. The tension between competition
and protection has been decisively resolved in favor of trademark protection in
two important statutory enactments: the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. In both statutes, a shift in
favor of greater protection, even perhaps a trend back toward a formalistic
"property rights" approach, can be observed. In both instances, trademarks are
treated more as property rights entitled to absolute protection. By analogizing
trademarks to "property," it becomes easier to reason deductively that
trademarks should be endowed with all kinds of additional protections. The
new federal anti-dilution statute would appear to be an example of analogizing
trademarks to "property."'62 Thus, after the attack on trademarks by legal
160. The Court in Qualitex recognized the potential for anticompetitive effects if a "color scarcity"
problem arises. But the Court held that the trademark doctrine of "functionality" would be available
to prevent "anticompetitive consequences" in that event. "The functionality doctrine thus protects
competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that trademark protection
might otherwise impose, namely their inability reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related
product features." Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306.
161. The lower federal courts have not been deaf to these signals from the Supreme Court.
Compare Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1208 (1983) ("For policy reasons, this circuit has expressed a preference to read the Lanham
Act narrowly . . . . To read the Act more broadly invites anticompetitive and irrational market
behavior.") with Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643-44 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Innovation in product
design and marketing for the purpose of enhancing producer identity reduces the cost to consumers of
informing themselves about the product source so that they can either continue purchasing the products
from particular producers or avoid the products from those producers altogether.") and Sunbeam
Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1554 (S.D. Miss. 1996) ("However, the issue of
competition in this case must be tempered when one attempts to compete unfairly.").
162. However, this legislative development is not necessarily typical of the reasoning adopted by the
courts in expanding other areas of trademark protection. Most modem courts do not apply a
conception of trademarks as "property" in a formalistic manner to decide specific issues in trademark
law. Even though trademarks are loosely included as "intellectual property," most courts appreciate
that the limited form of exclusive right conferred by trademark protection is qualitatively different from
the type of absolute right to exclusion characteristic of other forms of property, particularly real and
personal property. This distinction has been recognized in much of the case law. See 1 MCCARTHY
supra note 6, § 2.06.
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realists and antitrust enforcers during the mid-twentieth century, it would appear
that we have seen in the last decade something of a legislatively mandated
return to the formalism that resulted in greater trademark protection in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. In short, we have come full
circle."6
1. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Congress significantly expanded
the scope of trademark protection by passage of the Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988,'64 which amended the Lanham Act. Although the Revision Act
left much of the Lanham Act unchanged, it made some procedural changes
involving trademark registration that resulted in a significant substantive
expansion of trademark rights.
The Revision Act eliminated the requirement that a trademark applicant
must wait to file for a mark until common law rights have been established
through use. The Lanham Act had followed the common law by requiring use
of a trademark prior to making a trademark application with the Patent and
Trademark Office. But the U.S. "use-first" system put U.S. companies at a
disadvantage to the "registration-first" systems used in other countries, which
give foreign competitors advantages because of reciprocal registration rights.165
Trademark owners wanted protection before doing "trial runs," when a
trademark has been provisionally selected and is subject to being copied before
final registration. American trademark owners strongly favored the Revision
Act's rejection of a use-first system."
Although the American use-first system was almost unique internationally,
it was consistent with the prior common law approach to trademark protection.
Under the Lanham Act of 1946, marks that were never used could not be
properly registered with the Patent Trademark Office ("PTO"). 167  This
163. For a modem criticism of the pejorative use of the label of "formalism," and an argument in
favor of formalism as a rule-bound method of decisionmaking, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L. J. 509 (1988). Judge Posner contends that his economic theory of the common law embraces
aspects of both legal realism and legal formalism.
It is realist because the concepts which provide the major premises for common law reasoning
... could be, and no doubt would be ... altered by the judges in response to changing
perceptions of public policy .... Once the basic premises are chosen on realist grounds ....
deduction can proceed without violating realist norms.... The modem exemplar of formalism
in common law is the positive economic analysis of that law which Professor Landis and I and
others have expounded.
Posner, supra note 125, at 185-86 (but also arguing that formalism and realism have no application to
statutory and constitutional law). See generally Page, supra note 126, at 42-70 (concluding that in
antitrust cases the Supreme Court has adopted a "legal process jurisprudence" in response to the realist
critique by the Chicago School of Warren era decisions).
164. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1994)).
165. See United States Trademark Association ("USTA"), Trademark Review Commission, Report
and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 392-93
(1987) [hereinafter Report of the Trademark Review Commission], reprinted in USTA, THE
TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACr OF 1988, at 75 (1989).
166. Id.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (requiring trademark applicant to state "the date of applicant's first use
of the mark").
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requirement was consistent with the general approach of the Lanham Act that
the statute did not create trademark ownership but simply allowed registration
of trademarks whose ownership had already been accomplished by a bona fide
trade use.' 68 By requiring prior use of a mark before registration, the Lanham
Act was consistent with common law trademark and unfair competition law of
protecting business goodwill against misappropriation or "passing off" by
unscrupulous competitors. Only trademarks in actual use could be the subject
of a trademark infringement suit based on likelihood of confusion. In short, the
Lanham Act of 1946 was consistent with common law themes of protecting
goodwill and enforcing commercial morality.
The Revision Act, by allowing applications for registration of marks not yet
in use, moves trademark protection closer to a "property" conception. Once
anyone applies to register a trademark, even if it is not yet in use as the
identifier of product source, it will be constructively "owned" by the appli-
cant.169 The first to file has priority in the mark over even a competitor who
first actually uses the mark as the identifying source of its products if that first
use occurred after the other's application. 7 ° In such a case, the first to apply
may in effect take any business goodwill built up by a competitor who was the
first to use the mark. The Revision Act does, however, attempt to mitigate any
effort to register marks improperly by imposing an "intent-to-use" requirement
on the applicant. In addition, the new law provides that registration by the
PTO on the Principal Register will not actually occur until after an applicant for
a mark has actually made a bona fide use in the trade. 7' But the first "intent-
to-use" applicant still retains substantial rights.
This expansion of the Lanham Act is arguably consistent with a "property
rights" notion of trademark. Indeed, the Revision Act has been criticized as
inconsistent with economic theories that support trademark use.172  The
argument is that by allowing rights for an applicant in marks that are not merely
inventive or fanciful, competitors might be placed at some disadvantage in
choosing more desirable marks.173 Thus, Congress has gone beyond both the
common law and a pure Chicago-School economics justification for trademarks
by passage of the Revision Act.
168. Under both the common law and the Lanham Act, trademark rights were obtained by adoption
and use in commerce. See, e.g., Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., 811 F.2d 1470, 1472
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Law Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1271
(2d Cir. 1974).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1994) (providing in pertinent part that "the filing of the application to
register such mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority,
nationwide in effect, on or in connection with the goods or services").
170. See Warnervision Entertainment, Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1996).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).
172. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990). But other "law and
economics" adherents have taken the position that trademark rights should be viewed as property
rights. See Easterbrook, supra note 125, at 112 ("[A] right to exclude in intellectual property is not
different in principle from the right to exclude in physical property."); Meiners & Staaf, supra note 127,
at 912 (arguing that intellectual property is like any other exclusive private property right).
173. Carter, supra note 172.
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2. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. Nowhere is the law of
trademarks more dramatically evolving than with respect to the anti-dilution
amendment to the Lanham Act, Section 43(c)(1), the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995.174 The federal dilution statute is designed to protect
"famous" marks against unauthorized use in situations where trademark
infringement does not exist."'5 Some states had already enacted anti-dilution
cases during the past several decades. Unlike traditional trademark infringe-
ment cases, state law dilution lawsuits have not required proof of a likelihood
of consumer confusion between products. In such cases, there is little danger
of a competitor stealing customers by passing off its goods as another's. Thus,
for instance, use of the name "Spa'am" for a wild boar Muppet may be
actionable even though "Spa'am" the Muppet is not a competitor of SPAM, and
there is no risk that consumers will confuse "Spa'am" the Muppet with SPAM
the food product. 176 The new Federal Dilution Act expressly provides that
dilution may occur "regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception." '77
Dilution is grounded on the idea that a trademark can lose its "ability...
to clearly and unmistakably distinguish one source" through unauthorized
use.178 Dilution laws protect against either the "blurring" of a trademark's
product identification or the "tarnishment" of the affirmative association a
trademark comes to convey. "[D]ilution by blurring may occur where the
defendant uses or modifies the plaintiff's trademark to identify the defendant's
goods and services, raising the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to
serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff's product."'79 On the other hand,
a trademark may be tarnished if it is "linked to products of shoddy quality or
is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context."' 18 The new Federal
174. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(c)(1), (1127) (Supp. 1 1996).
175. "The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." Id. § 1125(c)(1).
176. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996) (suit arising
under New York dilution statute, holding no dilution on the facts).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 11996); see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey, Combined Shows, Inc.
v. Utah Division of Travel Dev., 935 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Va. 1996) (claiming that "The Greatest Snow
on Earth" on Utah license plates diluted "The Greatest Show on Earth" for the circus).
178. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 24.13[1], at 24-106.
179. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). Dilution is a "gradual whittling
away of a firm's distinctive trademark or name." Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical
Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (N.Y. 1977).
180. Deere, 41 F.3d at 43. Most state-law dilution cases dealing with parody involve tarnishment
of the mark. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995) (Michelob Oily joke ad); Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Debbie Does Dallas" pornographic film). The new Dilution
Act does not cover such "noncommercial use of a mark" as parody. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1573-74 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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Dilution Act prohibits dilution under both the "blurring" and "tarnishment"
theories.181
Anti-dilution laws derive from the concept that trademarks are property
rights."8 Their value can be diminished by unauthorized use even in the
absence of likelihood of consumer confusion over competing goods. The
trademark bar actively championed passage of anti-dilution statutes to protect
trademarks as "property rights."183 The enactment of the federal legislation
was hailed by trademark holders as a "significant step forward in protecting
famous trademarks through the recognition that the presentation of a
trademark's uniqueness or singularity is a valuable property right deserving of
protection."" But the anti-dilution statute goes far beyond the traditional
and Chicago School justifications for trademark protection. Like the formalist
view of trademarks in the early twentieth century,1 85 once a trademark is
treated as "property," broad rules of protection follow through simple deduc-
tion."s This formalistic application of the property concept in trademark law
was what so offended the legal realists.1"
D. Cyberspace and Beyond
In the 1990s, trademark practitioners confront the problems of the use of
trademarks in the computer age. The personal computer revolution, including
widespread use of the Internet, presents trademark law with a new context in
181. Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1573; Clinique Laboratories Inc. v. DEP Corp. d/b/a Basique Labs,
Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7045 (SAS), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15003 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1996).
182. See Rudolf Callman, Unfair Competition Without Competition? The Importance of the Property
Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 443, 453-54, 466 (1947) ("The protection that
can be granted to a trade-mark on the basis of a property right is most extensive .... Therefore, a
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which to apply traditional doctrine--cyberspace. t' Commentators have
written about the problematic effect on the enforcement of trademarks caused
by the mass usage of electronic mail, on-line services, and the Internet."8
Among the trademark issues that have arisen on the Internet is whether the
Internet domain names (for example, http://www.internic.net/) that serve as
addresses on the Internet can be the subject of trademark infringement
actions1" and whether domain names may be registered as trademarks.'
Courts have held that the new Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 may
provide a basis for protecting famous marks that are used by others as domain
names on the Internet."9 Another difficult issue is whether the courts will
afford trade dress protection for computer screen displays."3  A more
conventional problem is the unauthorized use of a trademark on a worldwide
web site or a computer bulletin board service's online display.194 As this
technology progresses, the tension between access and protection of trademarks
will become more acute.'95
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registrar, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") of the Internet Network Information Center ("InterNIC").
Since 1995, NSI has revised its rules to require a representation from new applicants that use of its
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The conflict of property rights and competition in cyberspace has already
resulted in a revitalization of antitrust law in this context. While issues of
trademark enforcement were not directly involved, the Department of Justice
investigation and subsequent settlement with Microsoft Corporation196




The history of trademark law can best be understood against the backdrop
of larger trends in legal philosophy, theory, and doctrine. The perceived tension
in trademark law between protecting entitlements and encouraging competition
through free access to marks has long animated trademark law and doctrine.
This tension is most dramatically illustrated by the interplay between trademark
law and the antitrust laws. As the political currents became more conservative
after the 1960s and 1970s, the pendulum swung back to greater protection for
trademarks and less expansive application of antitrust law in the trademark
context. Influenced by the Chicago School, current antitrust and economic
theory holds that trademarks are pro-competitive, which the courts and
enforcement agencies have largely accepted as resolving any conflict in
trademark law between competition and protection. In the legislative arena,
there has even been a revival of the view that trademark rights are "property
rights." Whether the trend toward greater protection of trademarks will
continue into the computer age in the next century remains to be seen.
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